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Sperber (1994) suggests that competent hearers can deploy sophisticated 
interpretative strategies in order to cope with deliberate deception or to 
avoid misunderstandings due to speaker’s incompetence. This paper 
investigates the cognitive underpinnings of sophisticated interpretative 
strategies and suggests that they emerge from the interaction between 
a relevance-guided comprehension procedure and epistemic vigilance 
mechanisms. My proposal sheds a new light on the relationship be-
tween comprehension and epistemic assessment. While epistemic vigi-
lance mechanisms are typically assumed to assess the believability of 
the output of the comprehension system (Sperber et al. 2010), I argue 
that epistemic assessment plays an additional role in determining this 
very output.
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1. Communication and speaker’s intentions
Current research on linguistic communication is grounded on the well-
established assumption that “[h]uman communication is characterised, 
among other things, by the fact that communicators have two distinct 
goals: to be understood, and to make their audience think or act ac-
cording to what is to be understood” (Sperber et al. 2010: 364). This is 
captured by Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) defi nition of ostensive-
inferential communication. According to them, ostensive-inferential 
communication takes place when communicators produce an utterance 
(or any other ostensive stimulus) with the following two intentions: (i) 
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an informative intention to inform the audience of something, and (ii) 
a communicative intention to inform the audience of one’s informative 
intention (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 29).1 More technically, the 
informative intention is defi ned as the intention to make manifest or 
more manifest to the audience an array of propositions I, whereas the 
communicative intention is defi ned as the intention to make it mutu-
ally manifest to audience and communicator that the communicator 
has this informative intention.2
Understanding requires the fulfi lment of the communicative inten-
tion, that is, the recognition of the speaker’s basic level/informative 
intention, but it might not require the fulfi lment of the latter. This is 
the case with assertions. Understanding is achieved when it becomes 
mutually manifest to the communicator and the audience that the 
speaker has asserted that P. However, this does not require the as-
sumption P to increase its manifestness, that is, to become more likely 
to be entertained and accepted as true. If we limit ourselves to asser-
tions, we could say that the informative intention is about getting the 
audience to believe, and the communicative intention is about getting 
them to understand. Understanding is a matter of recognising what 
the speaker intends you to believe.
Crucially, an audience can understand an utterance without believ-
ing what they have understood. In this case, the communicative inten-
tion is fulfi lled without the corresponding informative intention being 
fulfi lled. As Wilson and Sperber (2004: 611) suggest, typically “[w]het-
her the informative intention itself is fulfi lled depends on how much 
the audience trusts the communicator”. While understanding is under-
pinned by the pragmatic ability to recover the speaker’s communicated 
meaning on the basis of linguistic and contextual cues, the epistemic 
assessment which leads to its acceptance (or rejection) is carried out by 
what Sperber et al. (2010) call ‘epistemic vigilance’.
Before exploring the nature of epistemic vigilance mechanisms, I in-
tend to show that the possibility of comprehension without acceptance/
belief is warranted by the defi nition of communicative and informative 
intentions provided by Sperber and Wilson. To begin with, it is worth 
noting that their defi nition of manifestness is epistemic in nature: a 
proposition is manifest to an individual at a given time to the extent 
that he is likely, to some positive degree, to entertain it and accept it 
as true. Given that communicative and informative intentions are con-
ceived of as intentions to change the degree of manifestness of certain 
1 In contrast with Grice (1957), Sperber and Wilson reject the idea that the 
communicator must have a third-level intention that the addressee’s recognition of 
her informative intention should be at least part of his reason for fulfi lling this. This 
allows Sperber and Wilson’s account of ostensive-inferential communication to cover 
the whole continuum from pure cases of ‘showing’ to pure cases of ‘meaning’. See also 
Sperber and Wilson (2015).
2 See Sperber and Wilson (2015) for a detailed discussion on the notion of 
‘manifestness’. 
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assumptions, the following question seems to arise. Is the rejection of 
the communicated content compatible with the idea that manifestness 
involves acceptance on the interpreter’s part?3 In order to answer this 
question, it is worth stressing that in those circumstances in which the 
addressee understands a piece of communicated information without 
ending up believing it, the communicative intention is fulfi lled without 
the corresponding informative intention being fulfi lled. The informa-
tive intention is recognised (rather than fulfi lled). The fulfi lment of the 
communicative intention entails that the fact that the communicator 
has a certain informative intention, let’s call it “ii”, is made mutually 
manifest. That is, the fact that the communicator has the intention ii 
is likely to be accepted as true by the audience (and the communicator) 
and this is itself manifest. This does not seem to be problematic: while 
the audience is likely to accept as true the fact that the speaker has the 
intention ii (i.e. the intention to make manifest or more manifest to the 
audience an array of propositions Ii), the audience is not bound to ac-
cept as true any of the propositions which are included in Ii. The audi-
ence accepting as true the array Ii would correspond to the fulfi lment of 
the informative intention (but it is not a condition for its recognition).
Importantly, the output of the pragmatic system is metarepresenta-
tional in nature. According to Relevance Theory, utterance interpreta-
tion is a process that starts with a metarepresentation of an attributed 
utterance (‘The speaker uttered u’) and ends with a metarepresenta-
tion of an attributed thought or set of thoughts (‘The speaker commu-
nicated I’). Understanding requires entertaining and accepting as true 
this metarepresentational output.
2. Epistemic vigilance
Sperber et al. (2010) suggest that humans have developed “a suite of 
cognitive mechanisms”, which is targeted at the risk of misinformation 
in communication. Each of them is likely to be specialised in one of the 
many kinds of considerations relevant to warranting (or undermining) 
epistemic trust.
But what exactly is ‘epistemic trust’? It can be defi ned as the will-
ingness to believe the communicator and accept her claims as true. 
Communicators are not always competent or benevolent and commu-
nication is thus open to the risk of misinformation. A competent com-
municator possesses genuine information (rather than misinformation 
or no information), whereas a benevolent communicator is willing to 
share the information he has (as opposed to asserting false informa-
tion because of indifference or malevolence). If communication has to 
remain advantageous on average (as its pervasiveness in our social in-
teractions suggests it is), humans have to deploy an ability to calibrate 
their epistemic trust. This ability is ‘epistemic vigilance’.
3 Thanks to Steve Oswald for raising this question at the PragLab Research 
Colloquium in Linguistics in Fribourg (May 2015).
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Sperber et al. (2010) conceive of epistemic vigilance as a cognitive 
adaptation for social exchange. As Cosmides and Tooby (1992: 166) 
suggest, “each cognitive specialisation is expected to contain design 
features targeted to mesh with the recurrent structure of its charac-
teristic problem type”. Thus, a closer investigation of its ‘problem type’ 
will shed some light on the nature and function of the cognitive mecha-
nisms underpinning epistemic vigilance as a whole.4
The ‘problem type’ that represents the target of epistemic vigilance 
is the risk of misinformation in communication. Misinformation can be 
either accidental or intentional. The former is often the result of speak-
er’s incompetence, the latter of speaker’s malevolence. An incompetent 
speaker may communicate information that is false because she takes 
it to be true; a malevolent speaker may communicate false information 
with the intention of deceiving her interlocutor.
These alternative and recurrent features of misinformation suggest 
that some of the epistemic vigilance mechanisms should check for the 
reliability of the source of information, where reliability is a function of 
both speaker’s competence and speaker’s benevolence. In other terms, 
epistemic vigilance should help us with monitoring who to believe (i.e. 
individuals who are both competent and trustworthy).
A growing body of research on the development of the epistemic vig-
ilance capacity towards the source indicates that this ability emerges 
very early in development (for a review, see e.g. Harris (2012), Robin-
son and Einav (2014)). Some form of epistemic vigilance may be pres-
ent from the very age infants have actually been tested. For instance, 
as reported by Koenig and Harris (2007), when 16-month-olds saw pic-
tures of familiar objects and heard accurate/inaccurate labels from (a) a 
human looking at the picture, (b) a human with her back to the picture, 
(c) an audio speaker, they tended to be surprised when label (a) was 
false, when label (b) was true, and not surprised either way by (c). 
By 2 to 4 years of age, children employ a number of criteria for eval-
uating the reliability of the speaker. They show selective trust based 
on past accuracy (2-year-olds, see Koenig and Harris (2007)), speaker’s 
attitude (indications of certainty/hesitation) (3 year-olds, see Matsui, 
Rakoczy, Miura and Tomasello (2009)), true knowledge vs. past accu-
racy (4-year-olds, see Einav and Robinson (2011)).
As far as epistemic vigilance towards deception is concerned, chil-
dren become able to cope with intentional deception from 4 to 6 years of 
age (Mascaro and Sperber 2009). This capacity requires sophisticated 
mindreading abilities, as the interpreter needs to combine a fi rst-order 
attribution of belief (‘The speaker believes that not-P’) with a second-
order attribution of intention (‘The speaker wants me to believe that 
P’).
4 Both Sperber and Cosmides and Tooby advocate the massive modularity view of 
the mind, that is, the view that the mind is a system of evolved cognitive mechanisms 
that are dedicated to a particular task (hence domain-specifi c) and interact with 
each other in constrained ways.
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The reliability of the source of information, however, is not the only 
factor affecting the believability of a piece of communicated informa-
tion. The content of information may itself be more or less believable, 
independently of its source (with tautologies and logical contradictions 
lying at the two extremes of a continuum of believability). Thus, Sper-
ber et al. (2010) argue for the existence of a second cluster of epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms, that is, mechanisms which assess the quality of 
the incoming information (i.e., what to believe). They check its factual 
plausibility by assessing its consistency with existing knowledge and 
its degree of evidence. According to Sperber et al. (2010), the beliefs 
against which the communicated information is tested are those that 
are automatically activated by the comprehension process and used in 
the pursuit of relevance. These are a subset of the mental encyclopae-
dia of the addressee, and provide the ground for an “imperfect but cost-
effective epistemic assessment (Sperber et al. 2010: 374). When the 
result of this assessment is a contradiction, there are three possible 
outcomes: (i) if the source is taken as trustworthy and the background 
beliefs of the interpreter that confl ict with the incoming information 
are not held with much conviction, these beliefs are corrected; (ii) if 
the source is not regarded as trustworthy, the new information is re-
jected; (iii) if the source is regarded as authoritative and the confl icting 
background beliefs are held confi dently, some process of (typically con-
scious) coherence checking is triggered. The choice among (i), (ii), and 
(iii) partly depends upon the output of epistemic vigilance mechanisms 
focused on the source (the speaker).
In conclusion, according to Sperber et al. (2010), the gap between 
comprehension and acceptance/belief is bridged by epistemic vigilance 
mechanisms, which play a signifi cant role in fi ltering incoming infor-
mation with the aim of minimising the risk of misinformation. In what 
follows, I will address the question of what role (if any) epistemic vigi-
lance mechanisms may play in the comprehension process itself.
3. Comprehension and epistemic assessment
3.1 Sperber et al.’s (2010) ‘pragmatic’ model
Sperber et al. (2010) have recently proposed a model of the relation 
between comprehension and epistemic assessment that, for reasons 
which will soon become apparent, we shall call the ‘pragmatic’ model. 
According to Sperber and colleagues, comprehension and epistemic as-
sessment are parallel processes which are triggered by the very same 
act of ostensive communication. While comprehension is underpinned 
by a relevance-guided comprehension procedure, epistemic assessment 
is carried out by dedicated mechanisms which contribute to the capac-
ity for ‘epistemic vigilance’.
Relevance Theory claims that comprehension is driven by the ex-
pectations of relevance which are raised by every ostensive stimulus. 
Specifi cally, every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own 
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optimal relevance, that is, the expectation that the stimulus will be 
relevant enough to the addressee (to be worth processing) and that it 
is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker’s abilities and 
preferences. This presumption justifi es the adoption of the following 
comprehension heuristic:
(1) Relevance-guided comprehension procedure
Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: 
a. Test interpretative hypotheses (disambiguations, reference 
resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfi ed.
 (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 613)
Interestingly, Sperber et al. (2010) maintain that comprehension and 
epistemic assessment are interconnected aspects of a single process 
whose goal is to make the best of communicated information and they 
suggest that considerations of believability play a crucial role in the 
comprehension process itself:
“We claim that, whether he ends up accepting it or not, the hearer inter-
prets the speakers as asserting a proposition that would be relevant enough 
to him provided that he accepted it” (Sperber et al. 2010: 386)
This is, however, a ‘hypothetical’ role: comprehension initially proceeds 
as if the interpretative hypotheses under construction were to be ac-
cepted as true. Given such an assumption, the fi rst hypothesis that 
satisfi es the addressee’s expectations of relevance is attributed to the 
speaker as her intended meaning. No actual assessment of the believ-
ability of that hypothesis needs to take place at this stage. Importantly, 
the presumption of optimal relevance which is communicated by every 
ostensive stimulus need not to be true or accepted as true: the speaker 
might fail to achieve relevance either because of incompetence or ma-
levolence (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 158–159). However, the very 
fact that the presumption is communicated is enough to guide the inter-
pretative process. To illustrate this point, Sperber and colleagues dis-
cuss the following example. Andy and Barbara have decided to throw a 
party and Barbara has asked Joan to bring a bottle of champagne.
(2) a. Andy (to Barbara): A bottle of champagne? But champagne is 
expensive!
b. Barbara: Joan has money.
Imagine that Andy had previously assumed that Joan was a junior 
underpaid academic. In the context at issue, Barbara’s utterance would 
make a relevant contribution to the discussion if Andy interpreted it 
as communicating that Joan has enough money to be easily able to af-
ford champagne. The interpretation that Joan has some money (which 
is not only true but also compatible with Andy’s background belief) 
would make little sense as a conversational move at this point of the 
conversation. Considerations of relevance lead Andy to interpret Bar-
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bara’s utterance in the expected way: the interpretation that Joan has 
enough money to be easily able to afford champagne is relevant to Andy 
provided that he accepts it as true. Andy may decide to reject the com-
municated information (for instance, because he thinks that Barbara 
does not know that Joan is only a teaching assistant who is paid on an 
hourly basis) but, whether or not he ends up believing it, he will inter-
pret it in order to optimise its (intended) relevance.
In line with this, Origgi (2008) suggests that interpretation involves 
a ‘stance of trust’ that our interlocutors will provide relevant informa-
tion for us. Any departure from the satisfaction of our expectations of 
relevance may result in a revision or a withdrawal of the initial trust 
with which we approach the interpretative process: this is why the 
stance of trust is ‘dynamic’—it is only tentative and labile, but it plays 
a crucial role in determining the output of the comprehension system. 
It is crucial to notice, thought, that while Sperber et al. (2010) see 
comprehension and epistemic assessment as parallel processes trig-
gered by the same piece of communicative behaviour (‘The speaker has 
uttered u’), they think of their interaction as limited in scope. The only 
role of the epistemic vigilance system is to assess the believability of 
the interpretation resulting from the comprehension process (in light 
of considerations about both communicator’s reliability and content’s 
believability). In what follows, I suggest that the interaction between 
comprehension and epistemic assessment has a wider scope than pre-
viously assumed and, as a result, it may be more fi nely articulated.
3.2 Competence, benevolence and interpretative strategies
It is worth beginning our investigation of the relationship between 
comprehension and epistemic assessment by considering examples that 
give rise to clear off-line intuitions about how our interpretative prac-
tice might be affected by considerations about the moral and epistemic 
trustworthiness of our interlocutors.
Sperber (1994) invites us to consider the following scenario. Imag-
ine that Carol and John are going to a party and they have planned to 
leave their child at home with the baby sitter. The baby sitter usually 
leaves at midnight. That day, however, thinking that the party would 
be great fun, Carol has made a special arrangement with the babysitter 
and she will stay until one. Crucially, Carol does not know that John 
is aware of this. Later that night, Carol is not enjoying the party and, 
at around 11.30pm, she says to John “It’s late” expecting him to think 
that it is time to go home because of the baby sitter. The interpretation 
of Carol’s utterance “It’s late” depends on whether the addressee (John) 
trusts the speaker (specifi cally, on whether he assumes that Carol is 
behaving benevolently). If John assumes Carol’s benevolence, he will 
be bound to misunderstand her. She could not intend to communicate 
something that she knows to be false, so he would take it that she in-
tended to communicate that it is late with respect to some other sched-
190 D. Mazzarella, Pragmatics and Epistemic Vigilance
ule or expectation (for instance, that it is late if they want to catch the 
last train to get home). On the other hand, if he recognises that Carol is 
trying to deceive him, he will correctly attribute to her the intention to 
communicate that it is time to go home because of the baby sitter.
Let us consider a modifi ed version of this scenario. Imagine that 
Carol and John are at the party and no special arrangement has been 
made with the baby sitter, who will leave, as usual, at midnight. Un-
beknownst to Carol, John is very worried about a delivery that should 
have been made that very day. At 11.30pm, Carol says to John “It’s 
late” expecting him to think that it is late because of the baby sitter. 
Because he is caught up in his thoughts, the fi rst interpretation to come 
to John’s mind is that the delivery is late. Once again, the interpreta-
tion of the utterance “It’s late”, which is eventually attributed to Carol, 
depends on whether the addressee trusts the speaker (this time, on 
whether John assumes that Carol is competent, that is, she possesses 
genuine information as opposed to misinformation or no information). 
If he does, he will be bound to misunderstand her by mistakenly at-
tributing to her the intention to communicate that the delivery is late. 
If he realises that she could not intend to communicate something that 
she does not know, he would take it that she intended to communicate 
that it is time to go home because of the baby sitter.
These examples, taken together, suggest that consideration of the 
speaker’s benevolence and competence may affect the way in which we 
interpret what she says. An adequate account of pragmatic processing 
should shed some light on how this happens to be the case. With regard 
to this, Sperber (1994) suggested that competent interpreters have 
sophisticated interpretative strategies at their disposal, which allow 
them to cope with deliberate deception or to avoid misunderstandings 
due to speaker’s incompetence. This proposal has been given only a 
relatively marginal role within the development of Relevance Theory in 
the following years. In what follows, I present the interpretative strate-
gies proposed by Sperber (1994) and suggest the existence of an inter-
esting link between these strategies and the operations of epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms.
Sperber (1994) suggests the existence of three interpretative strate-
gies, which he labels ‘naïve optimism’, ‘cautious optimism’ and ‘sophis-
ticated understanding’, which can be seen as different versions of the 
relevance-guided comprehension procedure:
(1) Relevance-guided comprehension procedure
a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: 
Test interpretative hypotheses (disambiguations, reference 
resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfi ed.
As emphasised by Wilson and Sperber, clause (b) of the relevance-guid-
ed comprehension procedure “[..] allows for varying degrees of sophis-
tication in the expectations of relevance with which an utterance is 
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approached.” (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 625). Importantly, the differ-
ence between the three strategies relies on different assumptions about 
the communicator’s competence and benevolence, which in turn raise 
different expectations of relevance (hence determine different stopping 
points in interpretation). A naïvely optimistic hearer takes for granted 
that the communicator is behaving both benevolently and competently: 
he takes the communicator to be competent enough to avoid misun-
derstanding, and benevolent enough not to lead him astray. Thus he 
expects ‘actual optimal relevance’. A naively optimistic hearer looks 
for an interpretation that is relevant enough to him and he assumes 
that it is the intended one. In contrast, a cautiously optimistic inter-
preter assumes the communicator to be benevolent, but not necessarily 
competent: the communicator, in fact, may not know what is in the 
addressee’s mind and thus fail to produce the most relevant stimulus 
for him. As a consequence, he looks for ‘attempted optimal relevance’. 
Finally, a sophisticated interpreter drops not only the assumption that 
the communicator is behaving competently, but also that she is be-
having benevolently. Then the expectations of relevance that guide the 
comprehension procedure and determine its stopping point are expec-
tations of ‘purported optimal relevance’. The following table illustrates 
the three different versions of the relevance-guided comprehension 
procedure (which differ with regard to clause (b)):
Three versions of the relevance-guided comprehension procedure:
(a) Follow a path of least effort in computing 
cognitive effects: Test interpretative hypotheses 
in order of accessibility.
Naïve optimism (b1) Stop when your expectations of actual optimal 




(b2) Stop when your expectations of attempted 
optimal relevance are satisfi ed (i.e. stop at the 
fi rst interpretation that the communicator 




(b3) Stop when your expectations of purported 
optimal relevance are satisfi ed (i.e. stop at the 
fi rst interpretation that the communicator 
might have thought would seem relevant 
enough to you)
Successful interpretative paths may require the adoption of sophisti-
cated interpretative strategies. Let us consider, for instance, the ex-
amples discussed above. With regard to the delivery-example, if John 
were a naively optimistic interpreter, he would attribute to Carol the 
fi rst interpretative hypothesis that is relevant enough to him. The fi rst 
interpretation that comes to John’s mind is that the delivery is late. 
192 D. Mazzarella, Pragmatics and Epistemic Vigilance
Given its relevance to John, a naïve interpreter would retain it and 
mistakenly attribute it to the speaker. But what if John adopted the 
cautiously optimistic version of the relevance-guided comprehension 
procedure? John would not take for granted Carol’s competence and he 
would be vigilant to the possibility that Carol may not know what he 
knows (and may consequently fail in her attempt to make the relevant 
information that she intends to convey more accessible than any other 
possible interpretation). John would realise that Carol could not have 
intended the interpretative hypothesis The delivery is late to occur to 
him (precisely because she does not know that he is waiting for a de-
livery). Carol could not have thought that this interpretation would 
be relevant enough to him as she, Carol, has no thoughts of any sort 
involving this delivery. Thus, the comprehension procedure would go 
further and test the next most accessible interpretative hypothesis. For 
instance, it would access and assess the interpretation that it is time 
to go home because of the baby sitter. Since John takes it that Carol 
might have thought this interpretation to be relevant enough to him 
(as in fact it is), the interpretation is selected and attributed to Carol. 
With regard to the deceptive version of this example, it is possible to 
show how both a naïve and a cautiously optimistic interpreter would 
fail in attributing to the speaker the intended interpretation. Let us 
assume that the fi rst interpretation to come to John’s mind is the (in-
tended) interpretation that it is time to go home because of the baby 
sitter. However, John immediately realises that this is not the case, as 
he knows that Carol and the baby sitter have made a special arrange-
ment for that night and that the baby sitter will leave later than usual. 
If John were a naively optimistic interpreter, he would discard that 
interpretation, as it is not relevant to him (he knows it to be false). If 
he were a cautiously optimistic interpreter, he would also discard it 
given that it is not an interpretation that Carol might have thought 
would be relevant to him (having made the arrangement herself, Carol 
knows that it is not the case that it is time to go home because of the 
baby sitter). Only the adoption of a more sophisticated interpretative 
strategy would allow John to correctly attribute this interpretation to 
Carol. John would realise that Carol might have thought that this in-
terpretation would seem relevant to him (as she does not know that 
John is aware of this special agreement) and, if he had reasons to think 
that she might want to deceive him, he would end up attributing that 
interpretation to her.
3.3 The role of epistemic vigilance in comprehension
Utterance interpretation may depend on considerations about the 
speaker’s competence and/or benevolence. The issue of what brings 
such considerations to bear on the interpretative process, however, 
has not been addressed within the literature. My proposal is that the 
expectations of relevance which guide the comprehension procedure 
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and determine its stopping point are directly modulated by the opera-
tions of epistemic vigilance mechanisms. That is, epistemic vigilance 
mechanisms can modulate the hearer’s expectations of relevance (i.e. 
from ‘actual’ to ‘attempted’ or ‘purported’ optimal relevance) and as-
sess whether the interpretative hypothesis under construction satisfi es 
these expectations.
If the interpreter is vigilant towards the speaker’s competence and 
fi nds reasons to doubt it, he will expect ‘attempted’ optimal relevance. 
As a consequence, he will stop at the fi rst relevant interpretation that 
the speaker might have thought would be relevant to him (as described 
in the cautiously optimistic version of the relevance-guided compre-
hension procedure). If the interpreter is vigilant towards the speaker’s 
competence as well as her benevolence and he realises that the speaker 
may want to deceive him, he will expect ‘purported’ optimal relevance. 
In this case he will stop at the fi rst interpretation that the speaker 
might have thought would seem relevant enough to him.
In the same vein as my proposal, Padilla Cruz (2012) has suggested 
that epistemic vigilance should be considered as the trigger for a shift 
in interpretative strategies. For instance, if epistemic vigilance detects 
that the interlocutor is not a very competent communicator, it may 
trigger a shift from naïve optimism to cautious optimism. I believe, 
though, that the recent work on epistemic vigilance should be seen as 
encompassing Sperber’s (1994) original proposal. Once epistemic vigi-
lance is brought into the picture, the three interpretative strategies are 
found to be redundant. For instance, a cautiously optimistic interpreter 
may be seen not as an interpreter who is prompted to adopt a particu-
lar strategy by his epistemic vigilance mechanisms (as Padilla Cruz 
suggests), but rather as an interpreter who is actively monitoring the 
speaker’s competence through his epistemic vigilance mechanisms. A 
very interesting and plausible picture emerges: the three interpreta-
tive strategies described above may simply be an epiphenomenon of the 
interaction between a single comprehension procedure and epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms.
Before developing this proposal with regard to the examples under 
discussion, it is worth noting that Sperber and colleagues suggest that 
epistemic vigilance mechanisms towards the source of information can 
deliver either general impressions of trustworthiness or more costly as-
sessments that result from context-sensitive evaluations of the reliabil-
ity of the speaker. With regard to the latter, they note the following:
Clearly, the same informant may be competent on one topic but not on oth-
ers, and benevolent towards one audience in certain circumstances, but 
not to another audience or in other circumstances. This suggests that trust 
should be allocated to informants depending on the topic, the audience, and 
the circumstances. (Sperber et al. 2010: 369)
The defi nition of trustworthiness provided by Sperber et al. (2010) is 
thus intrinsically context-dependent; and it could not be otherwise. To 
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elaborate on this point, let us focus on speaker’s competence. For every 
speaker, there is always some information that she does not possess and 
some false assumptions that she takes to be true. However, this is not 
what ‘competence’ is about. If this were the case, every speaker would 
have to be classifi ed as incompetent and would not be entitled to receive 
our epistemic trust. Competence has a narrower and context-sensitive 
scope: the same communicator may be competent on one topic but not 
on others. The investigation of epistemic vigilance mechanisms that can 
assess competence (as well as benevolence) in a context-sensitive way 
will prove to be crucial for a general understanding of epistemic vigi-
lance, and my proposed interaction with the comprehension system.
To clarify the dynamics of the hypothesised interaction between the 
relevance-guided comprehension procedure and epistemic vigilance 
mechanisms, let us consider again the example “It’s late”, where the 
fi rst interpretative hypothesis to come to the hearer’s mind is that the 
delivery is late but this does not correspond to the intended interpre-
tation. My suggestion is that the construction of an interpretative hy-
pothesis provides a hypothesised topic of conversation. This, in turn, 
serves as input to epistemic vigilance mechanisms which assess the 
competence of the speaker on a particular topic. In this case, the inter-
pretative hypothesis that the delivery is late provides a hypothesised 
topic of conversation (i.e. the delivery) with regard to which epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms assess Carol’s competence. These mechanisms 
access the piece of information that Carol does not know that John is 
waiting for a delivery. As a consequence, an incompatibility between 
the speaker’s system of beliefs and the interpretative hypothesis under 
construction is detected. This inhibits the comprehension procedure 
and prompts it to access (and assess) the next most accessible interpre-
tative hypothesis.
Let us now consider the deceptive version of this example, where 
Carol’s utterance “It’s late” is intended to be interpreted as implicitly 
communicating that it’s time to go home because of the baby sitter. 
Suppose that the fi rst interpretation to come to John’s mind in this 
context is the interpretation that it is time to go home because of the 
baby sitter (where this conclusion is warranted by the explicature of “It 
is late” and the implicated premise The baby sitter typically leaves at 
midnight). Once again, this provides a hypothesised topic of conversa-
tion, that is, the baby-sitter arrangement, which, as in the previous 
example, triggers epistemic vigilance mechanisms which assess the 
speaker’s competence on that topic. These mechanisms access the piece 
of information that Carol believes that it is not the case that the baby 
sitter will leave at midnight. Given that the interpretative hypothesis 
is not compatible with the speaker’s epistemic state, a cautiously opti-
mistic hearer would discard this hypothesis and look for a different in-
terpretation. However, if the hearer’s epistemic vigilance mechanisms 
targeted at assessing the speaker’s benevolence detect that the speaker 
has the deceptive intention of making the hearer (falsely) believe that 
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it is time to go home because of the baby sitter (and if this intention is 
also compatible with what the hearer believes the speaker takes to be 
the hearer’s epistemic state, i.e. Carol does not know that John knows 
that the baby sitter will stay until one), the interpretation would be 
retained and attributed to the speaker. As Sperber and colleagues sug-
gest, “[w]hen epistemic vigilance is targeted at the risk of deception, it 
requires an understanding not only of the communicator’s epistemic 
states but also of her intentions, including intentions to induce false 
beliefs in her audience” (Sperber et al. 2010: 372). In our example, the 
hearer understands that Carol believes that not-P but she wants him 
to believe that P (P = it is time to go home because of the baby sitter).
As the discussion of these examples illustrates, not only do epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms affect the believability of a piece of communicat-
ed information (as proposed by Sperber and colleagues), but they also 
contribute to the assessment of the interpretative hypotheses under 
construction. That is, not only do they establish whether an interpreta-
tion attributed to the speaker (i.e. the output of the comprehension pro-
cedure) is allowed to enter the ‘belief box’ of the interpreter, but they 
also assess whether an interpretative hypothesis under construction is 
to be retained and attributed to the speaker as the intended interpreta-
tion (i.e. whether it ends up being the output of the comprehension sys-
tem or not). As far as this latter role is concerned, epistemic vigilance 
mechanisms may fi lter out interpretative hypotheses that, although 
relevant, are incompatible with the speaker’s mental states (i.e. her 
beliefs and desires). In this case, they may prompt the comprehension 
process to continue and assess further interpretative hypotheses. In 
other circumstances, they may prevent the comprehension procedure 
from abandoning an interpretative hypothesis that is irrelevant (to the 
hearer, e.g. he knows that it is false) but compatible with the speaker’s 
mental states (e.g. her intention to induce false belief in the hearer).
3.4 Implications
It is worth investigating the implications of this proposal for the rela-
tionship between comprehension and epistemic assessment. Specifi cal-
ly, the question of whether the epistemic assessment that is involved 
in comprehension exhausts the validation-process for communicated 
information shall be addressed. According to my proposal, the effects of 
epistemic vigilance on comprehension and acceptance/belief can be ei-
ther simultaneous (when no further epistemic assessment beyond that 
involved in comprehension is needed) or serial. When the addressee 
arrives at the intended interpretation via the recognition that the com-
municator is trying to deceive him, it is plausible to assume that no 
further epistemic assessment will be undergone and the output of the 
comprehension process will be automatically prevented from entering 
the addressee’s belief box. This seems to be the case in the deceptive 
version of the example discussed above. If John correctly reaches the 
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intended interpretation that it is time to go home because of the baby 
sitter via the recognition of Carol’s deceptive intention, he won’t fur-
ther assess the believability of this interpretation after attributing it to 
Carol. However, when the role played by epistemic vigilance is that of 
warranting an interpretation that is compatible with the speaker’s sys-
tem of beliefs, it is still an open issue whether or not the interpretation 
selected is worth being accepted as true (i.e. believed). For instance, 
in the delivery-example discussed above, John recognises that Carol 
could not intend to communicate that the delivery is late, as she is not 
aware that he is waiting for a delivery. As a consequence, he looks for 
an interpretation that is compatible with Carol’s system of beliefs, e.g. 
that it is late if they want to catch the last train. Once this interpreta-
tion has been attributed to Carol as the intended interpretation, it is 
still an open question whether John should accept it as true or not. For 
instance, it might contradict some of his strongly held beliefs concern-
ing the recent introduction of a 24-hour train service and could thus 
be rejected as false. In this case, rejection (or acceptance/belief) will be 
the result of a process of epistemic assessment that takes place on the 
output of the comprehension system.
Finally, let us explore the implications of this hypothesised interac-
tion between the comprehension system and epistemic vigilance mech-
anisms with regard to the relationships among Sperber’s (1994) three 
interpretative strategies:
Much of everyday communication takes place between people who are be-
nevolent to one another and who know one another well enough. In such 
circumstances, cautious, and even naïve optimism can serve as default in-
terpretation strategies […] Still, when the optimistic strategies fail, a com-
petent hearer resorts to the sophisticated strategy. (Sperber 1994: 198, em-
phasis added)
In line with this, if we assume that more sophisticated interpretative 
strategies are implemented by the operations of epistemic vigilance 
mechanisms, we can endorse the idea that optimistic interpretative 
strategies might represent a ‘preferred’ option, but reject the claim 
that optimistic strategies must fail in order for the interpreter to resort 
to ‘sophisticated understanding’. Rather, addressees may start by be-
ing vigilant and only grant trust if they have no reasons to doubt the 
communicator’s competence and benevolence. If they do have reasons 
to doubt her trustworthiness, they will downgrade their initial expec-
tations of ‘actual’ optimal relevance to expectations of ‘attempted’ or 
‘purported’ optimal relevance. As emphasised by Sperber et al. (2010), 
epistemic vigilance is not the opposite of trust, but it is the opposite of 
blind trust. To clarify this point, Sperber et al. (2010: 346) develop the 
following enlightening analogy: when we walk down the street through 
a crowd of people, we typically do not have any hesitation about walk-
ing among them, despite the risk of being accidentally or intentionally 
hit by them. However, we do monitor the trajectory of others and if we 
detect the presence of a careless or aggressive individual, we raise our 
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level of vigilance. This low-level, unconscious, vigilance allows us to 
enjoy our stroll while preventing us from any risk of collusion. In other 
words, our mutual trust is buttressed by our mutual vigilance.
4. Conclusions
While the interaction between the comprehension system and epistem-
ic vigilance mechanisms has not been much explored, its centrality has 
already been recognised:
[…] the abilities for overt intentional communication and epistemic vigi-
lance must have evolved together, and must also develop together and be 
put to use together. (Sperber et al. 2010: 360, emphasis added)
This passage suggests three different perspectives that are relevant 
to the investigation of epistemic vigilance in communication: an evo-
lutionary perspective, a developmental perspective, and a ‘pragmatic’ 
perspective. The main focus of this paper was to explore the ‘pragmatic’ 
dimension of this interaction.
According to Sperber et al. (2010), comprehension and epistemic as-
sessment are triggered by any act of ostensive communication: while 
comprehension follows a relevance guided procedure which selects the 
interpretative hypothesis that would be relevant to the hearer if he 
accepted it, epistemic vigilance mechanisms assess the speaker’s reli-
ability and the factual plausibility of the communicated content and 
establish whether the selected interpretation is indeed worth being ac-
cepted as true. Going beyond this proposal, I argued that, not only do 
epistemic vigilance mechanism assess the believability of the output 
of the comprehension system, but they also play a crucial role in de-
termining that output. As discussed above, epistemic vigilance mecha-
nisms towards the source modulate the expectations of relevance that 
drive the comprehension procedure. If they detect that the speaker is 
not competent, they downgrade the initial expectation of actual opti-
mal relevance to attempted optimal relevance. Similarly, if epistemic 
vigilance mechanisms towards deception detect that the speaker is 
not benevolent, they set the expectations of relevance at an even lower 
grade, that is, purported optimal relevance. As a consequence, epistem-
ic vigilance mechanisms may fi lter out interpretative hypotheses that 
are incompatible with assumptions about the speaker’s epistemic state 
or retain interpretative hypotheses that are irrelevant to the address-
ee (e.g. because he knows them to be false) but compatible with the 
speaker’s deceptive intention. This has important consequences for the 
relationship between comprehension and epistemic assessment. Cru-
cially, epistemic assessment taking place after comprehension can be 
made redundant whenever the selection of the intended interpretative 
hypothesis is grounded on the recognition that the speaker has a decep-
tive intention. If it is by realising that the speaker has the intention to 
mislead him that the addressee recognises what the speaker intended 
to communicate, there is no need to further assess the believability of 
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the misleading pieces of communicated information. However, when 
the role of epistemic assessment in comprehension is that of warrant-
ing an interpretation that is compatible with the speaker’s epistemic 
state, it remains an open question whether the communicated content 
is worth being accepted as true. In this latter circumstance, further 
epistemic assessment would typically follow comprehension.
Interestingly, this proposal has potential implications for the de-
velopment of pragmatic abilities. Sperber’s (1994) hypothesised that 
the three interpretative strategies corresponding to naïve optimism, 
cautious optimism and sophisticated understanding might represent 
different developmental stages. That is, children would start as naïve 
optimistic interpreters and subsequently deploy increasingly sophis-
ticated interpretative strategies, which are based on the recognition 
that the speaker may not be competent or benevolent. In light of my 
proposal on the interaction between the comprehension system and 
epistemic vigilance mechanisms, such strategies may emerge thanks 
to the unfolding of epistemic vigilance capacities in the child’s cogni-
tive development. This sheds a new light on the relation between com-
municative abilities and other types of metarepresentational capacity 
(in particular, epistemic vigilance), which is open to further empirical 
investigation.
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